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The Hidden Tactile Negotiation 
Sign Language in Somaliland's 
Livestock Markets
Ahmed M. Musa and Raphael Schwere 
I. Introduction
Price negotiations in the livestock marketplaces in Somaliland are not 
carried out openly. An exclusive circle of initiated and highly skilled 
market insiders, the brokers, representing sellers and buyers, use a 
tactile sign language to bargain. And, additionally, these negotiators 
cover their signing hands with a shawl (cumaamad in Somali) in order 
to hide the haggling from the curious glances of the bystanders. The 
brokers, however, only strictly censor price figures, while they orally 
and loudly substantiate their tactile signed offers by pinpointing the 
qualities of the animal or herd under consideration.
This tactile hidden negotiation in the Somali livestock trade was 
mentioned in a poem by Ismaaciil Mire, a well-known Somali poet 
who lived in Togdheer region somewhere between the late 19th and 
mid 20th century. Ismaaciil, criticized the practice and the dealings and 
norms in the marketplace generally. He believed the livestock broker 
who sold his livestock cheated him. Interestingly, until today criticism 
did not fall silent. And, the contestation of the practice is not directed 
to this particular way of negotiating exclusively. Some behaviours in 
Somaliland’s livestock markets (seylado) are perceived as anti-norm. 
Also, newcomers are excluded from the activities and are left in limbo 
and darkness concerning the procedures in the trade.
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II. Literature Review
A. Silent Trade Practices.
Detailed descriptions of the hidden tactile price negotiation sign lan-
guage in the Somali livestock markets are scarce. However, there is 
a body of literature about similar phenomena on the African conti-
nent and the Arabian Peninsula. In this literature, silent or ‘dumb’ 
barter trade, is described abundantly.1 A good number of historians 
and anthropologists (cf. the lists of important primary and secondary 
sources, including Herodotus, Ibn Battuta, Grierson, Polanyi, etc., in 
Bonner 2010) observed silent economic exchanges. For example, in 
pre-colonial West Africa, foreign traders started barter with locals by 
depositing goods at a specific place and then retreated and waited for 
the latter to put down their articles, which they deemed of appropri-
ate value, next to the items for exchange. Then the residents retreated, 
and the foreigners revisited the barter place and either left it with the 
offered goods or retreated again and waited for the locals to reconsider 
their offer and top-up their deposition (Fage and Tordoff 2013, 46). This 
kind of barter between groups with no shared language proceeded 
without personal contact or oral communication, let alone direct price 
negotiation by other means such as sign language. Importantly for our 
case, this forum of exchange excluded rival traders from offering their 
bid. 
Moreover, academics expressed considerable doubt that this prac-
tice was actually performed in exactly this completely non-verbal way 
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trade’ can apply to a spectrum of transactions” (including different 
ways of encounters and modes of non-verbal communication) and that 
most likely often some kind of “local brokerage” was involved (Fage 
and Tordoff 2013, 46; Hopkins 2014, 67; Bonner 2010, 37). Besides the 
element of lack of transparency of the barter for competing market 
participants, these rather vague and questionable accounts of the pre-
colonial West African silent trade, are not very helpful for understand-
ing the Somali hidden tactile negotiation sign language. In the latter 
case, the negotiating parties share a common language and hail from 
the same cultural background.
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B. Negotiating With Sign Language.
Bonner (2010) described a case study of the pre-Islamic Arabian way 
of wrapping up a deal without verbal negotiation. This kind of silent 
trade is in its procedure and geographically and (perhaps) culturally 
much closer to our case of the Somali hidden tactile sign language 
negotiation. About one kind of pre-Islamic silent trade, he writes: 
In pre-Islamic Arabia, as reported in the tradition on the markets, one 
method of concluding a sale was to do it non-verbally, with gestures, 
murmuring, and touching, perhaps using a system of sign language 
of which we have no further record. ‘Touching,’ ¬, here meant 
touching the other person’s arm or tugging at his clothing, and did not 
mean touching the object of sale. After the coming of Islam, there was a 
recollection that ¬ used to involve a mutual touching of the par-
ties during their negotiations. Soon, however, the original context—the 
silence imposed on these transactions—became obscure, and all that 
remained was a memory of the gesture of touching. (Bonner 2010, 32)
This corresponds to our case in various ways. Firstly, price negotiation 
is non-verbal. Secondly, traders have developed an elaborate sign lan-
guage for the sole and particular purpose of non-verbally negotiating 
prices. Thirdly, the sign language, unlike deaf sign language, does not 
function based on visual but on tactile codes—similar to deaf-blind 
sign language. Fourthly, this tactile negotiation language was used 
despite the fact that “in Arabia most market-goers spoke Arabic, and 
for those who did not, some sort of lingua franca must have been avail-
able” (Bonner 2010, 37). Thus, it was not a necessity because there was 
no shared language between the negotiating partners. Fifthly, the con-
sequence of using this mode of negotiation excludes competitors from 
offering their bid on the basis of knowledge of the price range negoti-
ated in. However, what is different from our case is: Bonner assumes 
that the “markets of the Arabs” were silent places, while Somaliland’s 
livestock markets, the seylado, are not (as will be described in detail 
below). Secondly, Bonner did not indicate that the tactile negotiation 
was hidden, for example with a shawl covering the negotiating hands 
as in our case. Hence, interestingly, the similarities of Bonner’s recon-
structions from his primary text sources and our contemporary anthro-
pological observations prevail. And, historically, Bonner’s description 
might even offer a potential clue to reach at an explanatory hypothesis 
53
ȱǯȱȱȱȱ 
about the origin of the Somali hidden tactile negotiation: it could pos-
sibly date back to pre-Islamic trade networks between the Arabian 
Peninsula and the Horn of Africa (Bonner 2010, 47). But that is an 
assumption for others to test. Our goal is to describe, contextualize, 
and develop an understanding for the reasons this kind of negotiation 
practice is so solidly embedded in Somaliland’s livestock trade in the 
past and today.
C. Accounts of the Somali ‘finger’ Negotiation Practice.
As we mentioned above, very little has been written about the Somali 
hidden and tactile livestock negotiation practice. However, there are 
numerous publications, academic and non-academic, about Somali 
livestock markets that offer a macro-perspective. These publications 
(e.g. Ciabarri 2010; Samatar, Salisbury, and Bascom 1988; Mugunieri 
et al. 2008) describe the functioning of the market generally, in institu-
tional, economic and also political terms, but mostly do not delve into 
the market microcosm of norms and practices. The ‘finger’ negotiation 
practice is mentioned, for example by Adam Ahmed Hussein, in his 
article about the marketing of Somali livestock, as a “‘private treaty’ 
haggling between buyers and sellers” (Adam Ahmed Hussein 2016, 
141), but not described in detail.
Other three examples of literature that contain slightly more 
detailed accounts describe the practice in the mid 19th and early and 
late 20th century. Richard Burton, the British explorer, described the 
practice, as observed in Saylac in 1854, as follows:
The citizens have learned the Asiatic art of bargaining under a cloth. 
Both parties sit opposite each other, holding hands: if the little finger for 
instance be clasped, it means 6, 60, or 600 dollars, according to the value 
of the article for sale; if the ring finger, 7, 70, or 700, and so on. (Burton 
1894, 87)
Interestingly, he calls it the “Asiatic art of bargaining”–maybe he refers 
to the above described ancient Arabian practices. Also, he was prob-
ably the first to describe the tactile codes in detail in English language. 
Unlike today, he mentioned that the traders were seated.
Lorenz Hagenbeck, a German animal trader and zoo director, 
describes in his autobiography the practice of Somalis in Djibouti 
in January 1906. Hagenbeck placed an order for 1000 dromedaries 
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which he had to supply “at top speed” to the German government for 
their “defence forces in South-West Africa.” (Hagenbeck 1956, 65) He 
described the trade as follows, emphasising the insider-outsider aspect 
of the practice: 
I could have been of no use in dromedary buying, for I had not mastered 
the secret finger-language used in that trade. The following was the pro-
cedure. Hersy Egeh and the seller took each other’s hands and covered 
them with a cloth. Thus they literally got into a huddle and, unseen by 
any of the dromedary salesmen clustering round them, bargained away 
unhindered to determine both fair price and Hersy’s share in it. It was all 
done by a complicated system of finger pressure, and there was only one 
man working with Carl Hagenbeck of Hamburg who knew all the tricks 
of the East African dromedary trade, and that was Hersy Egeh. (Hagen-
beck 1956, 69)
The historian Charles Geshekter, in this article about “Anti-Colonial-
ism and Class Formation” in “The Eastern Horn of Africa before 1950” 
briefly described how the dilaalin actually grab their fingers:
Among the Somalis, the procedures for exchanging animals involved an 
intricate bargaining process that sometimes was hidden (literally and 
figuratively) from nomadic producers. […] To commence the exchange, 
the dilaals [italics in original] would grasp hands under a small cloth and 
conduct a series of offers and counter-offers involving the assignment 
of monetary values to each digit. The top digit equalled 100, the middle 
one 200, and the third digit was worth 300. The prices were established 
by alternatively grasping each other’s digits until an agreement was 
reached and the two brokers then shook hands. (Geshekter 1985, 21–22)
D. Knowledge Gap.
This literature review yields two results. Firstly, the existing ‘silent 
trade’ conceptualizations are not fruitfully applicable to the Somali 
hidden tactile negotiation sign language practice. Secondly, there is 
a gap in the literature about Somali livestock trade when it comes to 
in-depth studies of the microcosm of the seylada, with its own norms 
and practices. For this reason, this article aims to fill this gap by ethno-
graphically describing and anthropologically interpreting the complex 
system of norms and skilled practices, adopting a micro-perspective 
lens. Additionally, our goal is also to contribute to the quite active 
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current scholarly debate on the Somali livestock sector, by providing 
a contemporary account of how the practice is embedded in the live-
stock marketplaces.
III. Methodology
The empirical data on which this analysis is based was gathered within 
the framework of two PhD research projects. Ahmed examines the 
post-war livestock economy in Somaliland. Raphael’s research proj-
ect investigates the transformation of human-camel relations and the 
accompanying changes of the skills of camel experts.
We separately conducted ethnographic observations and interviews 
in three livestock markets, in Burco, Hargeysa and Wajaale, between 
August 2016 and August 2018, and pooled our datasets after a joint 
research stay, again in Burco in Eastern Somaliland’s Toghdeer region 
from the end of July until early August 2018. Observations and infor-
mal interviews were carried out from early morning until noon, the 
active hours of the market. More structured interviews were conducted 
after the Asr prayers in the late afternoon. 
IV. The Ecology of Somaliland’s Urban Livestock Markets
The hidden tactile price negotiation is only practiced in the one institu-
tion of Somaliland’s livestock market, the livestock marketplace called 
seylada (singular of seylado). Marketplaces are spatially delineated 
places within which a number of social actors engage in various kinds 
of interactions and are connected by different relationships; all orches-
trated by timeframes, practical routines or procedures, norms, rules 
and regulations (cf. definition of marketplace in Bestor 2001, 9227–28). 
In the following, the seylada will be described as a microcosm of com-
plexly interwoven spatio-temporal, social, and normative dimensions 
that surround the skilled negotiation practice.
A. The Spatial, Temporal, and Social Contours of Seylada.
Livestock markets are publicly accessible areas that are partly fenced 
(brick-built, ironsheeted, or pricky shrub fences; they make herding 
of the animals easier), dusty open-air spaces. Within the boundaries of 
the marketplace, there are three (not physically) zoned areas for differ-
ent animals and markets: the shoats (sheep and goats) for export (area 
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name: ahmin), the shoats for the local meat market (dabaxaad, which is 
organized by women) and the camels (geel). Located in the periphery 
of these zones are the tea shops and kiosks where the market people 
take a rest, drink tea, or eat breakfast in the shadow, sheltered from 
sun, wind and dust. Apart from these simply constructed shacks, the 
inanimate inventory further consists of shade-giving roofs (hosting the 
shoats for local meat production market; laterally open), sand heap or 
concrete loading ramps (digo), loading and unloading animal transport 
lorries and passenger taxis or tuk-tuks, and Landcruisers of wealthier 
traders. All three seylado look more or less the same, only differing in 
their sizes and specialization on different animals. Also, we assume 
their appearance did not change much over time.
The marketplace is brought to life in the early morning around five 
when the tea shops start preparing breakfast for the arriving trad-
ers, brokers, and workers, while the first flocks of animals arrive by 
foot or lorry. Then, camels and small ruminants are traded in Burco 
and Hargeysa until noon, while cattle trading starts in Wajaale at 5:00 
a.m. and usually ends already before 9:00 a.m. The seylado are busy 
marketplaces in the morning and then turn into football fields in the 
afternoon. All the markets are open every day, including the local offi-
cial holiday Friday. Seasonally, the trade volumes change; the buzzing 
season peaks during Arafa, the Hajj season.2 Other factors that influ-
ence the trade volume are droughts and import bans, such as the dire 
period during and after the last drought in 2017 or Saudi import ban 
periods.3
There are around 26 different types of actors. Among them, the 
highly experienced traders and brokers (dilaalin; presented below) 
stand in the centre of all activities in the marketplaces. The traders 
(mainly in the export value chain) can be divided into jeeble, faashle and 
shirkad.4 The shirkad (Arabic, literally ‘company’) are the traders who 
work for exporters (to Saudi Arabia, specifically). The jeeble are trad-
ers who collect livestock from the rural areas (directly from livestock 
owners or from so-called bush-markets) and sell it on to the shirkad. 
The group of traders called faashle gathers and buys livestock brought 
to the marketplace directly by producers and sell it on to the shirkad for 
profit. Corresponding to these three types of traders, there are three 
types of brokers, the jeeble broker, the faashle broker, and the shirkad 
broker. The shirkad trader usually has a permanent broker, while the 
jeeble and faashle employ brokers ad-hoc. Furthermore, there is perma-
nent staff of the big export companies like counters and accountants, 
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and a large group of ad-hoc employed labourers. These are porters 
who help load and unload animals from and to lorries, herders who 
group, regroup and keep together groups of animals that the bro-
kers negotiate about, and herders who drive the animals from nearby 
xerooyin (singular xero, kraals) where they are fed and kept overnight 
when they are not sold immediately. There are also men who mark the 
sold animals with the new owner’s (Ǽ sign with paint, lorry driv-
ers, tea shop and kiosk operators, employees of the municipality who 
collect the taxes (per head), and, of course, pastoralists (livestock pro-
ducers) who bring their own animals directly or come to choose some 
for rearing purposes. The non-human population of the marketplaces 
consists of cattle, sheep, goats, camels.
B. The Dilaal.
The dilaal, the broker, mediates all the transactions and no transaction 
is conducted without him or her. Thus, the brokers constitute an exclu-
sive group of initiated and experienced individuals that specialize on 
one specific set of marketplace tasks only. Female brokers can only 
be found in the market section for the trade of animals for local meat 
production. The dilaalin are employed by the aforementioned traders 
or by the livestock producers directly. They are, as mentioned, the only 
actors who engage, commissioned by the seller or buyer respectively 
(the seller and buyer mostly neither meet nor know of each other), in 
the price negotiation—for which they use the hidden tactile sign lan-
guage. The seller and buyer usually select their brokers that are mem-
bers of their own kin group.
There are brokers of all Somali kinship categories, from as far as 
Ogaden, South- and Central-Somalia, represented in the marketplace, 
especially in the market in Burco. There are market segregations; the 
brokers of the different kin groups gather in different corners of the 
market, depending on the direction from where the transporters, 
producers, and traders of their kin enter the seylada. For example, in 
Hargeisa, the east is dominated by Habaryonis, the south by Edagale, 
and in the west by Sa’ad Muse. In Burco, the Habarjeclo and members of 
kinship groups from South- and Central-Somalia dominate the north-
east. Alternatively, the Habaryonis and Ogaden are located in the south. 
However, in terms of access, there are no restrictions. Anyone can 
enter and try making an effort to earn a living.
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Dilaalin are mostly men in their middle ages and usually hail from 
rural areas and pastoral lifestyles before they migrated to the livestock 
market towns. Or they previously worked in the local meat business. 
Senior dilaalin have double roles; they also work as wakiil (agents) for 
the jeeble of their kin.
During the market hours, they appear as rough-looking men with 
rugged clothes. Many wear a macawis (wrap skirt) and sandals. Their 
accessories include a cimaadmad (turban) and/or a shaal (shawl), one 
of which they use to cover up the negotiating hands; a budh (club) or 
bakoorad (walking stick), which they use to keep the livestock together 
and sometimes to defend themselves in the case of a conflict; some put 
on koofiyad (prayer cap) to protect themselves from the sun and also 
to look trustworthy; a small notebook and a pen to record their deals; 
and most of them wear a (vintage) CASIO digital watch with a steel 
bracelet.
Their habitus, both physical look and behaviour, changes com-
pletely when they leave the market. In the afternoon, they put on 
closed shoes and clean clothes, move with notebooks and pen and start 
doing the xisaab (math) after Asr prayers (that is, after they take a rest 
between the midday Dhur and the mid-afternoon Asr prayers). Doing 
the math means collecting money from buyers (the traders, local meat 
production business people, and pastoralists replenishing their herds 
with dhaqmaad5 animals), deducting fees and expenditures, delivering 
the money to the respective seller broker, and paying the seller (traders 
or local pastoralists).
The broker himself calculates his share, which is based on a per-
head remuneration (0.4-0.5 USD per head of goat or sheep; 10-20 USD 
per camel; received from either the buyer or seller depending on his 
role as buyer or seller broker). Broker assistants receive the qorax joog 
(literally: standing under the sun) fee, a kind of a tip from the buyer 
for the efforts in the morning (lump sum of 3-5 USD, depending on 
the number of traded camels). Further cuts that are made from either 
the buyer’s or seller’s capital are the debts owed to service providers. 
These are the livestock transporters (lorries or human trekkers), the 
herders that keep and feed the arriving animals outside town before 
they are taken to the market and sold, porters in the market who help 
with unloading from lorries, and the herders within the marketplace 
that keep the flocks of sheep and goats together. The latter receive 
the so-called gees qaarac (literally: hitting horns) fee from the seller. 
Lastly, the brokers also handle the tax payments to the municipality 
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that presides over the livestock market. Many of the seller traders 
do not return to the rural areas with cash but with consumer goods 
(sugar, rice, wheat flour, etc.) from the town’s stores which they re-
sell in villages. The brokers also have to clear these debts. All of these 
transactions are made in cash in the afternoon (no cash is brought to 
the market in the morning)6, dollars for ahmin and Somaliland shillings 
for dabaxaad livestock, and the brokers communicate with the debtors 
and creditors via mobile phones. Because the brokers do not have 
permanent offices, they conduct their afternoon tasks from backrooms 
of stores or hotel rooms (where the out-of-town traders lodge), where 
they comfortably sit on carpets, backs against big pillows, and sip tea. 
Others sit in places where they can chew qat, a mild stimulant narcotic, 
and smoke cigarettes. Among the countless phone calls are also inqui-
ries from potential future clients from Somaliland, Puntland, Somalia, 
and Ethiopia,7 who want to know about the state of the market, prices, 
and logistics in order to make informed economic decisions.
C. Behaviours, Norms, and Anti-norms.
During the hectic morning hours of the marketplace, the employed 
labourers and herders carry out their duties loudly by singing work 
songs and shouting commands and hitting the animals with their 
sticks. The traders and brokers engage in constant chatter in order to 
receive market information. Although the brokers silence the figures, 
they argue loudly and quarrel to underpin their claims while negotiat-
ing. 
The brokers behave aggressively. They threaten each other with 
their sticks, hurl slanders to each other (even to women, elderly, or 
religious men!), and shower abuses on men and animals around them. 
Some easily lose their temper while others at least act as if they are 
about to lose it in order to assure the opposing broker registers one’s 
seriousness. The Dilaalin quarrel and fight about who got commis-
sioned to sell or buy livestock for a trader and who can legitimately 
claim the commission fee.
This rough, noisy, and fast atmosphere infects everyone within the 
perimeter of the marketplace. In order to compete in this atmosphere, 
one has to adjust accordingly by acting aggressively. This behaviour 
side-lines elderly men, most women, and pious men and women, 
because they do not want to act according to this norm.
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Apart from the generally high volume of oral communication of 
Somalilanders in public spaces, these behaviours in the market, like 
the quarrelling and insulting, distinctively go against common public 
etiquette of interaction. It is somehow an antithesis to the atmosphere 
and norms of behaviour outside the boundaries of the market. Outside 
of it, the culturally and religiously defined etiquette guiding interac-
tion insists on respectfulness of the elderly and women and addressing 
somebody with flattering titles (Hajji8, brother, cousin, uncle, friend 
…), and general kindness with a touch of humour.
Thus, the hidden livestock price negotiation, accompanied by the 
loud argument, stands exemplary for a body of transgressive behav-
iours that are embedded and exclusively tolerated within the market. 
The traits of this negotiation practice can be seen as central and hence 
representative for the dynamics of the market generally. These are 
typical for all the other market-specific modes of interaction and its 
subcultural etiquette—which is contrarian to the norms outside of the 
market. The market therefore constitutes an arena in which behaviours 
and social norms, anti-norms, prevail that are sanctioned elsewhere. 
The seylado are microcosms, in which a group of actors dominate the 
activities by exhibiting behaviours that are exclusively tolerated in 
their subculture. Here, no one is held accountable for slanders or ver-
bal insults. Because this has become the norm, for outsiders to try to 
tame the marketplace people has proven fruitless (despite the outspo-
ken criticism, see below). Thus, the market is a contact-zone that is 
reigned over by initiated and skilled insider actors who fiercely defend 
their norms and codes despite criticism of the outsiders and the gen-
eral transformation of the livestock trade. After the lunch break, the 
brokers do not only appear with a different look but also a different 
behaviour. They break with their market habitus completely; they are 
relaxed and put on friendly faces.
D. The Hidden Tactile Sign Language Price Negotiation.
With the description of the context of the marketplace, the seylada, we 
move on to describe the actual practice that is the main purpose of the 
article. 
When livestock arrives in the market, driven by herders or unloaded 
from trucks, brokers gather around the animals curiously. That is when 
they start assessing the worth of the animals. The quality assessment 
is standardized with a grading system. Due to this collating of ani-
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mals into the grading system and the availability of the current market 
prices for each grade (due to market chatter), the attending brokers 
already share a similar asking price range. 
When the first buyer broker approaches the seller broker, the 
onlookers curiously follow the argument between the negotiating par-
ties. After a while, more and more are drawn to the site, and they 
gather around the livestock which is standing in the middle in a circle. 
The bystanders include lower-level brokers who also assist in keep-
ing the livestock together and then claim a small reward for it. They 
mainly make claims on livestock owned and sold by a trader from 
their kin. Sometimes, there are spies of rival shirkad traders among the 
onlookers. Such is the scene in which the negotiating brokers hide the 
prices over which they haggle. After grabbing each other’s right hand, 
they immediately cover them, from one’s mid-underarm to the other’s, 
with a piece of fabric, mostly turban or shawl cloths. 
Once their hands are covered, the buyer broker makes his 
first offer. The figures are tacitly and tactually signed by swiftly and 
skilfully grabbing either a specific number of fingers, by pressing 
the knuckles or bending the distal phalanges of specific fingers. The 
offered price, thus, is signed digit by digit.
1. grabbing of index finger 
2. grabbing of index finger and middle finger
3. grabbing of index finger, middle finger and ring finger
4. grabbing of index finger, middle finger, ring finger  
 and little finger
5. grabbing all fingers
6. pressing the knuckle of the little finger
7. pressing knuckle of the ring finger
8. pressing knuckle of the middle finger
9. bending distal phalanges of the index finger to the inside
10. pressing knuckle of index finger
The initiated negotiating partners are both always aware in which 
price range they are negotiating, thus, there is no confusion about the 
numbers. That is also why there is no tactile sign to separate decimals 
(67.5 is signed as 675). The difference between the initial offers of the 
two sides amounts perhaps to a maximum 50 USD for camels and less 
than 10 USD for shoats. 
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While the brokers are signing figures, as mentioned above, they talk 
about the qualities of the animals loudly. For example, they praise a 
camel’s constitution, highlight the thick layer of meat over the ribs, or 
the buyer broker might point out the less positive traits of the animal 
to lower the value. The conversation can be heated but also humorous– 
sometimes they both crack insider jokes. In this manner, the negotia-
tion round is a quickly concluded process. The experienced brokers 
have developed their tactile sign language skills at the beginning of 
their career and master it to perfection. Weighing up and calculating 
offers is delegated to their hands and fingers as the receiving and send-
ing entities of meaningful—in numeric and emotional terms—codes. 
Cogitating is embodied.
A broker who wants to express that he insists on a figure does this 
by not letting slip the other’s hand—he fixates the figure he wants with 
a hard grip. It is not common that the negotiators agree in their first 
attempt, which takes an average of 30 seconds. So, they part and repeat 
the procedure again later, sometimes several times. When no deal is 
struck but they are still desperate to get one done, an isku soo jiide (a 
mediator broker) intervenes. He grabs the hand of the seller broker, 
covers their hands, and then tries to finish the deal for the unsuccess-
ful buyer broker. But first, he is informed about the shirkad (buying) 
broker’s offer, also via covered hands. Then, he, while hidden, grabs 
hands with the jeeble (seller) broker to find out how much his offer is. 
At that moment, he proposes a new price. If still no agreement could 
be reached, the livestock is moved from the area of the market where 
the shirkad (buying) broker makes his offers to another rival shirkad 
where the process starts afresh. In the whole undertaking, the bystand-
ers, other brokers and professional outsiders, are never informed about 
the negotiated figures.
When two brokers finally agree on a figure, they confirm the deal 
with a hefty powerful handshake. Some seal and celebrate the deal 
with a hearty “Bismillah” (Arabic, in the name of God)ǯȱAfter this, 
the livestock (in the case of shoats) is moved in line and counted, the 
shirkad broker and his assistants inspect all the bought animals again. 
In case they find ill ones, they remove them from the purchased flock 
and price them differently. The negotiated price always only concerns 
one animal representing a specific grade (for camels). Later, it is mul-
tiplied by the actually chosen number of animals. As an exception, the 
price negotiation over large numbers of export shoats (sold by a jeeble 
to a shirkad trader) is not based on individual heads but a whole herd, 
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despite the different qualities of animals in it. Lastly, the seller broker 
usually confirms the price with the seller, the previous owner, and 
then lets the buyer broker know about the final decision. The buyer 
brokers (especially the shirkad) are mostly equipped with the authority 
of their commissioners to act autonomously.
E. Rationales for Adherence to and Criticism of the Practice.
A uniform and satisfactorily enlightening rationale for this practice 
is hard to come by. Various actors explain, defend, or criticise this 
at once ritualistic, theatrical, and hidden negotiation very differently. 
Additionally, it is a sensitive topic that few brokers like to discuss with 
outsiders openly. This is also due to the many critiques of the practice.
Most of the brokers claim that they adhere to the practice because it 
is caado, traditional custom. Asked about the consequence of the lack 
of transparency of prices, they argue that it is done in the best inter-
est for the organization of the market and economic benefits for all 
its participants. Firstly, concerning the organisation of the market, it 
enables brokers to strike deals more quickly without interference from 
the bystanders who could, if not hidden and silent, make theirs bids 
as well. As a result, more bargains can be closed uninterrupted. Sec-
ondly, concerning the economic benefactors, they artlessly explain that 
the practice allows for different prices for animals of the same qual-
ity. Hence, both seller and buyer, or seller broker and buyer broker, 
can potentially gain a better profit then his competitors. Also, traders 
can re-sell animals immediately after purchase for a higher price to 
another bidder, without the latter knowing of the initial price. Lastly, 
the broker potentially profits from the higher total number sold, as he 
rakes in a per head commission fee.
Still, we believe that we do not yet fully understand all the effects 
of the practice for different actors. We assume that the censorship defi-
nitely disadvantages outsiders or non-initiated newcomers (e.g. pas-
toral livestock producers and new brokers) in the market, as they are 
not able to assess the animals’ worth and thus cannot estimate the 
narrow price range within the experienced insider brokers negotiate. 
So, they are side-lined in a way or at least they risk selling below or 
buying above the insider prices. Thus, the hiding, the deliberate lack of 
transparency as a norm of the market, can be interpreted as a strategy 
for the brokers and their exclusive circle to protect their business and 
livelihoods.
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One line of critique of the practice comes in the form of an accusa-
tion that the brokers are insincere or even blatant cheaters. As a matter 
of fact, they call them “thieves” and interpret the hidden negotiation 
as “robbery.” The oldest source of critique is contained in a poem 
composed by the renowned Somali poet, Ismaaciil Mire, and an acute 
admirer of camels. Mire was born in the second half of the 19th century 
and died in 1950. In that poem, titled ‘Ooggii Horaynagu Keceen’9 (‘With 
the glow of dawn they came upon us’), he describes his background 
and his first visit to a livestock market, the one in Burco. There, he was 
caught off-guard by what he described as the “faithless” and “greedy” 
brokers. He did not understand their way of business and the money 
economy in general. Eventually, he left with a selling price, which he 
deemed unworthy. He was upset over the transaction conducted by 
the brokers.
Oh my wife, going back to my early ancestors 
They and I have never seen trade with money 
The men we are descended from used to have camels 
It was always my lot to get a share from the attacking campaigns 
Only once did I do something which my father did not do 
I took four nights to reach the village, which the camels were  
 loaded up for 
I reached the gate of Burco, I and my goods 
Immediately they approached as if they were ready for me 
With the glow of dawn they came upon us, the brokers of the  
 sheep and goats 
People whose good faith had been taken away gathered conspiratorially  
 against us 
I was astonished when they pressed the shoulders of the rams 
“It is that amount; no it isn’t” they argued bluntly 
The stubborn arguing disheartened me greatly 
The one with the twisted eye cheated me, the one whom I trusted 
They tried to console me with four shillings minus forty cents (4 annas) 
While I watched the hands with which I was bought 
The sheep and goats you are asking me about have fallen into  
 the hands of others 
Those whom I believe deserve to be hung from thorns by their  
 Achilles tendon 
That whip-like stick and the pieces of cloth they forgot near me 
Some men are more expert in process than me; ask them! 
(Ismaaciil Mire 2009, translated by Martin Orwin)
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Confronted with these accusations, the brokers reply that they do not 
cheat because of the risk for their reputation. Buyer and seller might 
meet each other and find out that the amount that one received differs 
considerably from what the other one paid. Reputation and trust are 
the most important ingredients for a successful broker carrier, they say. 
Otherwise, no one would engage them anymore.
The second line of critique is religiously motivated. Some critics say 
that the practice is “against our religion” or “haram.” There are two 
points of criticism here. The first concerns the relationship between the 
sexes in the marketplace. It happens, albeit rarely, that a female and 
a male broker engage directly in negotiations with each other. Some 
people are indignant at seeing unrelated men and women exchange 
handshakes. That is why many female brokers conduct their negotia-
tions with male brokers in “side meetings.” They move away from the 
crowd and negotiate orally but quietly so that nobody can hear the 
prices discussed. 
The second point of criticism concerns transparency. Quranic verses 
and stories of the Hadith about this matter are interpreted as follows: 
“Business and work in general have to rest on ethical and moral foun-
dations. The precondition for propagating and realizing this goal is 
transparency” (Ali and Al Owaihan 2008, 12). Interestingly, critics of 
trading practices that lack transparency already referred to silent nego-
tiation practices, voiced in their concern in the early days of Islam. 
Bonner writie: 
When Islam arrived, the memory of these old Arabian markets became 
negative and vague. For the disapproving Muslim jurists, the pre-Islamic 
marketplace provided the perfect example of gharar, the indeterminate 
or aleatory element that renders a transaction void and reprehensible. 
We can see now that the Muslim jurists were not being merely dog-
matic and close-minded on this point. For trading in pre-Islamic Ara-
bia did sometimes take place in conditions which resemble games of 
chance–conditions which were roundly condemned in the Quran and 
early Islam. (Bonner 2010, 46)
V. Conclusion
In order to conceptually frame the hidden tactile livestock price nego-
tiation practice, we would like to borrow from ‘classic’ conceptions in 
the sociology of markets. In this academic subfield, markets are arenas 
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of social interaction and considered central institutions of capitalist 
economies (Beckert 2009, 245). After the collapse of communism, mar-
kets have become places of coordination and exchange of complex 
capitalist economy (opposite planned economy) (Lie 1997, 341). For a 
long time, modern economists theorized on the basis of the assump-
tion that economic actors in the markets act rationally, are self-centred, 
and base their decisions on a freely accessible corpus of information 
(Beckert 2009, 246; Granovetter 1985, 485). However, during the sec-
ond half of the 20th century, a new generation of sociologically trained 
economists questioned the basic premise of the rationality of economic 
actor’s actions and the assumption of independence from local behav-
iours and institutions. This has created sustained debate between “for-
malists” and “substantivists” on the independence of markets from 
the sociocultural contexts and institutions (Geertz 1978, 28). The most 
important concept that emerged from the debate was the concept of 
“embeddedness” (Narotzky 2001, 4069). Embeddedness, inspired by 
Karl Polaynyi, is based on the assumption that contextual behaviours 
and notions such as trust, and institutions influence and sustain local 
economies (Lie 1997, 349). In this conclusion, we will try to explain 
the phenomenon at hand by borrowing this embeddedness concept. It 
guided our analysis of the organization of Somaliland’s livestock mar-
kets and the context specific practices and strategies employed by the 
market’s actors.
Livestock trade in Somaliland started in the pre-colonial period, 
way back before the modern central state institutions were intro-
duced. Since the pre-colonial period, the livestock traders invented 
and transferred indigenous knowledge from generation to genera-
tion. These skilled trade practices give livestock traders a competitive 
advantage, for example, by maintaining trade relationships over time 
and because of its neat and functional interconnection with all aspects 
of society. After the introduction of modern central state institutions, 
starting from the colonial administration, livestock trade was always 
conducted in the periphery and was largely governed by informal and 
indigenous practices and norms. Thus, analysing Somaliland’s live-
stock trade organisation using a neoclassical lens may yield no sub-
stantial revelation. An analysis based on embeddedness of traditional 
practices however is likely to offer new discernments which can be 
useful in understanding post-war and developing economies.
The literature has provided an insight into the long history of a 
skilled practice and embodied cognition that in today’s world might 
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seem outlandish and out-dated to many observers. The existing texts 
on silent trading and sign language negotiation show how these prac-
tices have and still do create connections and how they maintain the 
functionality of and social order in marketplaces—over time and 
against all odds, such as language barriers or socio-political and eco-
nomic transformations of the market and its surroundings.
We argue that hidden tactile livestock price negotiation sign lan-
guage is embedded in the marketplace. Firstly, we located the practice 
in the spatial and temporal contours of the seylada. Secondly, we tried 
to connect it to the main actors, who skillfully embodied their nego-
tiation cognition, and the normative framework within which they 
interact. We acknowledged both the brokers’ and critics’ explanations 
for their reasons for adhering to their ways or for their disgruntlement 
respectively. This helped to illustrate how the practice is interlinked 
with social and cultural, including religious, dynamics in Somalil-
and. The fact that the practice survived for a long time and that it is 
negotiated over and again, as the history of criticism depicts, demon-
strates the embeddedness of the practice in Somaliland’s social fabric.10 
The practice is a ritual that carries cultural meaning and therefore is 
trusted, and the brokers are trustworthy cultural figures. Furthermore, 
the marketplace is politically embedded: on one hand, state bureau-
cratic interventions in the market are reduced to taxation only; on 
the other hand, it is strongly connected to the kinship system and the 
pastoral political economy. We  assume that this political entanglement 
assures, as already mentioned above, the reproduction of this system. 
Lastly, the protection of a functioning system of organizing the market, 
is in the best interest of the whole society of Somaliland–considering 
that the export of livestock is one of the few sources of foreign cur-
rency of the country, and the domestic trade of animals is economically 
very important as well. However, we have to state that we cannot draw 
any conclusion about the question whether the market could be run 
more profitably without this practice.
Notes
1.  Many people inhabiting today’s globalized world have made similar experiences in 
their life when they encountered traders with whom no language is shared, and we 
therefore negotiate with hands or, often seen today, by typing offers and counter-offers 
into hand calculators or mobile phone displays.
2.  Saudi importers buy millions of shoats in the Hajj season because each pilgrim should 
slaughter an animal on the Hajj. The slaughtered animals, however, are then often not 
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eaten in Saudi Arabia but are shipped out to poorer Muslim countries around the world 
after slaughtering.
3.  Currently the import of camels from Somaliland into Saudi Arabia and Egypt are 
banned. These import bans are bypassed by exporting Somali livestock from the port in 
neighbouring Djibouti.
4.  Generally, these marketplaces host two different value chains. The export and the 
local meat production trade. The actors in these two differ slightly.
5.  Animals not for export or slaughter
6.  Some local buyers use the mobile money system Zaad to pay parts of the agreed price 
as an advance to make transactions of large sums–these cannot be handled with the 
inflation plagued Somaliland shilling as the volume of cash bundles would be too big 
and heavy.
7.  Livestock from all these regions are traded in Somaliland because of Somaliland’s 
Berbera port’s geostrategic position, only a few shipping hours away from the ultimate 
buyers in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, or Oman.
8.  Title of a person who has done the Hajj to Mecca, sometimes just flatterig
9.  Also known under the title ‘Ibsi Lacageed’, which loosely translated means ‘buying 
with cash.’
10. In the wider region, however, a co-existence of different price negotiation practices 
in Somali livestock markets can be observed. In the Somali-inhabited northeastern part 
of Ethiopia, for example, the hidden tactile price negotiation sign language was replaced 
by transparent practices, using boards listing current prices. We authors assume that in 
the process of regional integration, this non-synchronicity of trading practice will effect 
is more contestation in this regard as well.
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